

## The Limits Of Idealism When Good Intentions Go Bad Clinical Sociology Research And Practice By Melvyn L Fein 1999 10 31

Neo-Kantianism was an important movement in German philosophy of the late 19th century. Frederick Beiser traces its development back to the late 18th century, and explains its rise as a response to three major developments in German culture: the collapse of speculative idealism; the materialism controversy; and the identity crisis of philosophy.

This book represents a serious and sophisticated guide to modern American legal theory.

This book examines Heidegger's controversial relation to politics as it grows out of his understanding of his predecessors in German Idealism, most notably, Hegel. This way of developing a dialogue between Heidegger and Hegel on the issue of politics provides an important context for questioning the former's link with National Socialism. Yet the book does not simply condemn Heidegger for his Nazi involvement nor claim that his thinking is free from dangerous political implications. On the contrary, a second level of questioning asks whether Heidegger's philosophy can be appropriated in alternative contexts which permit the affirmation of democratic principles. Thus the book concludes by examining the import which Heidegger's thought has on cultivating such democratic motifs as freedom of speech and civil disobedience. The book is especially of interest to advanced undergraduates, graduate students, and scholars in the areas of German idealism, phenomenology, social and political philosophy, and the history of philosophy. Hegel is presented as a critical philosopher whose disagreements with Kant only enhance the idealist arguments against empiricism, realism and naturalism in this original interpretation.

After I had finished my presentation, a colleague and I sat rocking on the hotel porch to discuss its merits. It was a picture-perfect fall day in Jekyll Island Georgia, and he was a friend. Yes, he explained, what I was saying seemed to be true. And yes it probably needed to be said, but why did I want to be the one to say it? Wasn't I, after all, a tenured professor who didn't need to make a fuss in order to retain his job? Didn't it make sense to just kick back and enjoy the easy life I had earned? The topic of our tete-a-tete was my speculations about race relations and he was certain that too much honesty could only get me in trouble. Given my lack of political correctness, people were sure to assume that I was a racist and not give me a fair hearing. This was a prospect I had previously contemplated. Long before embarking on this volume I had often asked myself why I wanted to write it. The ideological fervor that dominates our public dialogue on race guaranteed that some people would perceive me as a dangerous scoundrel who had to be put in his place.

If the truth be known, I am only a partially reformed idealist. In the secret depths of my soul, I still wish to make the world a better place and sometimes fantasize about heroically eradicating its faults. When I encounter its limitations, it is consequently with deep regret and continued surprise. How, I ask myself, is it possible that that which seems so fight can be a chimera? And why, I wonder, aren't people as courageous, smart, or nice as I would like? The pain of realizing these things is sometimes so intense that I want to close my eyes and lose myself in the kinds of daydreams that comforted me as a youngster. One thing is clear, my need to come to grips with my idealism had its origin in a lifetime of naiveté. From the beginning, I wanted to be a "good" person. Often when life was most treacherous, I retreated into a corner from whence I escaped into reveries of moral glory. When I was very young, my faith was in religion. In Hebrew school, I took my lessons seriously and tried to apply them at home. By my teen years, this had been replaced by an allegiance to socialism. In the Brooklyn where I grew up, my teachers and relatives made this seem the natural course. When I reached my twenties, however, and was obliged to confront a series of personal deficiencies, psychotherapy shouldered its way to the fore.

This volume brings together for the first time a group of young researchers who can be seen as representative of a new generation of researchers working on German idealism. Over the past few decades, several generations of the reception of German idealist philosophers have resulted in an intensive, inspiring and fruitful debate about the concept 'recognition', a central topic in German idealism and the central topic of this book. Critically approaching many of the classical boundaries set up by earlier generations, the new wave of researchers in this volume explores, diagnoses, analyzes and evaluates the prospects for, and limits of, recognition from an informed yet independent perspective. The contributors to this volume overcome both the traditionally strong emphasis on practical, especially political, philosophy when dealing with 'recognition', and classical divisions such as the 'divide' between analytic and continental philosophy, or between Frankfurt School interpretations and more scholarly approaches. This unique combination of methodological interests leads to a variety of original voices which incorporate the history of reception, while also showing how German idealism continues to inspire new generations of philosophers. This book provides a first step toward a comprehensive conception of German idealism, through critical re-readings of the classical texts of German idealism, approaching their argumentative potential, their internal development, and, finally, their limits.

In this study of Hegel's philosophy, Brinkmann undertakes to defend Hegel's claim to objective knowledge by bringing out the transcendental strategy underlying Hegel's argument in the *Phenomenology of Spirit* and the *Logic*. Hegel's metaphysical commitments are shown to become moot through this transcendental reading. Starting with a survey of current debates about the possibility of objective knowledge, the book next turns to the original formulation of the transcendental argument in favor of a priori knowledge in Kant's *First Critique*. Through a close reading of Kant's *Transcendental Deduction* and Hegel's critique of it, Brinkmann tries to show that Hegel develops an immanent critique of Kant's position that informs his reformulation of the transcendental project in the *Introduction to the Phenomenology of Spirit* and the formulation of the position of 'objective thought' in the *Science of Logic* and the *Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences*. Brinkmann takes the reader through the strategic junctures of the argument of the *Phenomenology* that establishes the position of objective thinking with which the *Logic* begins. A critical examination of the *Introduction to the Lectures on the History of Philosophy* shows that Hegel's metaphysical doctrine of the self-externalization of spirit need not compromise the ontological project of the *Logic* and thus does not burden the position of objective thought with pre-critical metaphysical claims. Brinkmann's book is a remarkable achievement. He has given us what may be the definitive version of the transcendental, categorial interpretation of Hegel. He does this in a clear approachable style punctuated with a dry wit, and he fearlessly takes on the arguments and texts that are the most problematic for this interpretation. Throughout the book, he situates Hegel firmly in his own context and that of contemporary discussion." -Terry P. Pinkard, University Professor, Georgetown University, Washington, D.C, USA "Klaus Brinkmann's important Hegel study reads the *Phenomenology*

and the Logic as aspects of a single sustained effort, in turning from categories to concepts, to carry Kant's Copernican turn beyond the critical philosophy in what constitutes a major challenge to contemporary Cartesianism." - Tom Rockmore, McAnulty College Distinguished Professor, Duquesne University, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, USA "In this compelling reconstruction of the theme of objective thought, Klaus Brinkmann takes the reader through Hegel's dialectic with exceptional philosophical acumen.... Many aspects of this book are striking: the complete mastery of the central tenets of Kant's and Hegel's philosophy, the admirable clarity in treating obscure texts and very difficult problems, and how Brinkmann uses his expertise for a discussion of the problems of truth, objectivity and normativity relevant to the contemporary philosophical debate. This will prove to be a very important book, one that every serious student of Kant and Hegel will have to read." - Alfredo Ferrarin, Professor, Department of Philosophy, University of Pisa, Pisa, Italy

Not content with merely telling us how to find a way back to objective idealism, Hosle exhibits his philosophy in a wide-ranging series of essays on topics ranging from the greatness and limits of Kant's practical philosophy to the moral ends and means of world population policy, from moral reflection and the decay of institutions in the Enlightenment and Counter-Enlightenment to a reflection on philosophical foundations of a future humanism in our world of overinformation.

Explores some of the most urgent problems confronting contemporary European thought: the status of the subject after postmodernism, the ethical dimensions of critical theory, the encounter between psychoanalysis and philosophy, and the possibilities of non-foundational metaphysical thought.

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"Throughout the history of political philosophy and politics more broadly a debate has raged about the proper place of idealism versus realism in our thinking about political principles and institutions. Within contemporary political philosophy, this debate has taken the form of what is called "ideal theory" versus "non-ideal theory." Non-ideal theorists have tried to shift the focus of political philosophy from theorizing about the nature of concepts like "justice" to questions about which feasible institutional and political changes would make a society, or the world, more just. But what if, the ideal theorist asks, justice is a standard that no society is likely ever to satisfy? Could we somehow even know this is the case before seriously considering what justice requires? And, if social justice were unrealistic, would that mean that understanding justice is without value or importance, and merely idle utopianism? In *Utopophobia*, David Estlund argues that the best reasons for thinking either that justice must be realistic, or for thinking that there is no point in understanding justice unless it could be realized, are not convincing. No particular theory of justice is offered or presupposed by Estlund in this book, nor is it argued that justice is indeed unrealizable-only that it could be, and that this possibility upsets common ways of proceeding in political thought. The book, thus, represents a critical engagement with important strands in traditional and contemporary political philosophy which suppose that a sound theory of justice, or even the enterprise of political philosophy generally, has the sole or overriding and defining task of contributing practical guidance toward greater social justice. Along the way, Estlund argues against several tempting views; that the "circumstances of justice," as understood by Hume and Rawls, imply that the very idea of social justice is grounded in unfortunate but realistic conditions of individual moral deficiency; that inquiry in political philosophy could have significant value only insofar as it guides to practical political action; and that understanding true justice would necessarily have practical value, at least as an ideal arrangement to be approximated"--

This book examines Oakeshott's political philosophy within the context of his more general conception of philosophical understanding. The book stresses the underlying continuity of his major writings on the subject and takes seriously the implications of understanding the world in terms of modality. The book suggests strongly that Oakeshott's philosophy of political activity cannot be reduced to a branch of conservatism, liberalism, or postmodernism or a theory or set of doctrines which fit neatly into any conventional school, like that of Idealism or Skepticism. Rather, Oakeshott's philosophy of political activity is a provocation to all of the currently dominant schools of political theory and political practice. It questions their presuppositions and exposes as ambiguous, arbitrary, or confused all of the supposed certainties which they take for granted. It does all this by offering profound insights into the character and limits of both political activity and political theory in the modern world.

This updated edition offers a comprehensive, penetrating, and informative guide to what is regarded as the classical period of German philosophy. Kant, Fichte, Hegel, and Schelling are all discussed in detail, along with contemporaries such as Hlderlin, Novalis, and Schopenhauer, whose influence was considerable but whose work is less well known in the English-speaking world. Leading scholars trace and explore the unifying themes of German Idealism and discuss its relationship to Romanticism, the Enlightenment, and the culture of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Europe. This second edition offers an updated bibliography and includes three entirely new chapters, which address aesthetic reflection and human nature, the chemical revolution after Kant, and organism and system in German Idealism. The result is an illuminating overview of a rich and complex philosophical movement, and will appeal to a wide range of interested readers in philosophy, literature, theology, German studies, and the history of ideas.

Technology and Ethical Idealism investigates a pivotal intellectual and political moment in twentieth-century Indonesian history, the establishment of "development" as both an ideal and a practice. The focus of this study is on technological development as a central concern of colonial political life from 1900 to 1942 in the Netherlands East Indies. The foundations of developmentalist thinking and practice in the turn-of-the-century colonial reforms were called the Ethical policies. Tracing the interplay of Ethical politics at the highest levels of the Netherlands Indies colonial government with the technical practices of development taking place in the fields of ordinary Javanese farmers, it shows how and why technological development became such an enduring part of political and material life in the archipelago. This study offers a new history of the Ethical policies that focuses on their often-neglected technopolitical character, and the formative influence they exercised on development thinking in Indonesia among both Dutch experts and members of the community of Indonesian activists known as the *pergerakan*. In startling contrast with many histories of development, it shows how the interaction of colonial idealism and scientific practice led the Dutch to commit to small-scale change in their "development of the native peoples." As experts tailored technical solutions to ecological, social, and economic conditions of local areas, they eschewed high modernism in their search for colonial modernization, unexpectedly prefiguring the appropriate technology movements that arose decades later. Based on extensive research in the colonial archives in The Hague, the National Library in Jakarta, and the Bogor Library of Biology and Agriculture, this study draws on official documents and scientific research of the era, as well as public discussions in both Dutch and Indonesian language newspapers and journals in order to capture not just the official plans, but also a wide range of public critiques and responses to development, and the day-to-day practices that shaped the productive lives of ordinary farmers. Offering a new exploration of politics and technology in colonial Indonesia, this book will interest historians of Indonesia and Southeast Asia, historians of technology, and those seeking to understand the complex colonial roots of international development.

This volume collects all Henry Allison's recent essays on Kant's theoretical and practical philosophy.

Ethical constraints on relations among individuals within and between societies have always reflected or invoked a higher authority than the caprices of human will. For over two thousand years Natural Law

and Natural Rights were the constellations of ideas and presuppositions that fulfilled this role in the west, and exhibited far greater similarities than most commentators want to admit. Such ideas were the lens through which Europeans evaluated the rest of the world. In his major new book David Boucher rejects the view that Natural Rights constituted a secularisation of Natural Law ideas by showing that most of the significant thinkers in the field, in their various ways, believed that reason leads you to the discovery of your obligations, while God provides the ground for discharging them. Furthermore, the book maintains that Natural Rights and Human Rights are far less closely related than is often asserted because Natural Rights never cast adrift the religious foundationalism, whereas Human Rights, for the most part, have jettisoned the Christian metaphysics upon which both Natural Law and Natural Rights depended. Human Rights theories, on the whole, present us with foundationless universal constraints on the actions of individuals, both domestically and internationally. Finally, one of the principal contentions of the book is that these purportedly universal rights and duties almost invariably turn out to be conditional, and upon close scrutiny end up being 'special' rights and privileges as the examples of multicultural encounters, slavery and racism, and women's rights demonstrate.

This outstanding collection of specially commissioned chapters examines German idealism from several angles and assesses the renewed interest in the subject from a wide range of fields. Including discussions of the key representatives of German idealism such as Kant, Fichte and Hegel, it is structured in clear sections dealing with: metaphysics the legacy of Hegel's philosophy Brandom and Hegel recognition and agency autonomy and nature the philosophy of German romanticism. Amongst other important topics, German Idealism: Historical and Philosophical Perspectives addresses the debates surrounding the metaphysical and epistemological legacy of German idealism; its importance for understanding recent debates in moral and political thought; its appropriation in recent theories of language and the relationship between mind and world; and how German idealism affected subsequent movements such as romanticism, pragmatism, and critical theory. Contributors: Espen Hammer, Stephen Houlgate, Sebastian Gardner, Paul Redding, Andrew Bowie, Richard Eldridge, Jay Bernstein, Frederick Beiser, Paul Franks, Robert Pippin, Fred Rush, Manfred Frank, Terry Pinkard, Robert Stern

One of the very few accounts in English of German idealism, this ambitious work advances and revises our understanding of both the history and the thought of the classical period of German philosophy. As he traces the structure and evolution of idealism as a doctrine, Frederick Beiser exposes a strong objective, or realist, strain running from Kant to Hegel and identifies the crucial role of the early romantics--HÄ¶lderlin, Schlegel, and Novalis--as the founders of absolute idealism. Traditionally, German idealism is understood as a radical form of subjectivism that expands the powers of the self to encompass the entire world. But Beiser reveals a different--in fact, opposite--impulse: an attempt to limit the powers of the subject. Between Kant and Hegel he finds a movement away from cosmic subjectivity and toward greater realism and naturalism, with one form of idealism succeeding another as each proved an inadequate basis for explaining the reality of the external world and the place of the self in nature. Thus German idealism emerges here not as a radical development of the Cartesian tradition of philosophy, but as the first important break with that tradition.

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Reviews of this book: [A] magnificent new book...That Beiser manages to keep the reader afloat as he steers through such deep and turbulent waters deserves the highest praise. Expository writing of unfailing lucidity is supported by reference to an unrivalled range of sources...I learned something from this book on almost every page...For anyone at all seriously interested in the topic this is now the place to start. --Michael Rosen, Times Literary Supplement

Excerpt from The Limits of Evolution: And Other Essays Illustrating the Metaphysical Theory of Personal Idealism The thread connecting the following essays is already indicated on the title-page. They all illustrate, each from the field of its own subject, the metaphysical theory which I venture to call Personal Idealism. Partly, they show how this theory draws its arguments, as if unexpectedly, from the discussion now of this topic taken up for its own philosophical interest, and now of that; partly, they in turn reflect the light of the theory upon the discussion of the topic. To the running reader, the several papers, with titles so widely divergent, would hardly suggest any common trend of thought. They all have it, however; in fact, taken together, they may be said to present the mentioned philosophic theory in its bearings on all the chief human concerns, - on knowledge, joy, and devotion; on Science, Art, and Religion. Still, in view of the great diversity of their subjects, one might easily fail of a clear and firm seizure of the thought that unites them, unless the clue were given by some words of introduction. About the Publisher Forgotten Books publishes hundreds of thousands of rare and classic books. Find more at [www.forgottenbooks.com](http://www.forgottenbooks.com) This book is a reproduction of an important historical work. Forgotten Books uses state-of-the-art technology to digitally reconstruct the work, preserving the original format whilst repairing imperfections present in the aged copy. In rare cases, an imperfection in the original, such as a blemish or missing page, may be replicated in our edition. We do, however, repair the vast majority of imperfections successfully; any imperfections that remain are intentionally left to preserve the state of such historical works.

Includes lists of doctoral dissertations, 1935/36-

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The Limits of IdealismWhen Good Intentions Go BadSpringer Science & Business Media

This book proposes a new interpretative key for reading and overcoming the binary of idealism and realism. It takes as its central issue for exploration the way in which human consciousness unfolds, i.e., through the relationship between the I and the world—a field of phenomenological investigation that cannot and must not remain closed within the limits of its own disciplinary borders. The book focuses on the question of realism in contemporary debates, ultimately dismantling prejudices and automatisms that one finds therein. It shows that at the root of the controversy between realism and idealism there often lie equivocations of a semantic nature and by going back to the origins of modern phenomenology it puts into play a discussion of the Husserlian concept of transcendental idealism. Following this path and neutralizing the extreme positions of a critical idealism and a naïve realism, the book proposes a “transcendental realism”: the horizon of a dynamic unity that embraces the process of cognition and that grounds the relation, and not the subordination, of subject and object. The investigation of this reciprocity allows the surpassing of the limits of the domain of knowing, leading to fundamental questions surrounding the ultimate sense of things and their origin.

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