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Cutting the Fuse offers a wealth of new knowledge about the origins of suicide terrorism and strategies to stop it. Robert A. Pape and James K. Feldman have examined every suicide terrorist attack worldwide from 1980 to 2009, and the insights they have gleaned from that data fundamentally challenge how we understand the root causes of terrorist campaigns today—and reveal why the War on Terror has been ultimately counterproductive. Through a close analysis of suicide campaigns by Al Qaeda and other terrorist organizations in Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Lebanon, Israel, Chechnya, and Sri Lanka, the authors provide powerful new evidence that, contrary to popular and dangerously mistaken belief, only a tiny minority of these attacks are motivated solely by religion. Instead, the root cause is foreign military occupation, which triggers secular and religious people alike to carry out suicide attacks. Cutting the Fuse calls for new, effective solutions that America and its allies can sustain for decades, relying less on ground troops in Muslim countries and more on offshore, over-the-horizon military forces along with political and economic strategies that empower local communities to stop terrorists in their midst.

Is there a reason for the busy citizen-leader to read about air and space history, theory, and doctrine? Yes, asserts David Mets, because without some vision of what the future is likely to bring, we enter new conflicts unarmed with any ideas and highly vulnerable to confusion and

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paralysis. He wrote this book to help the aspirant American leader build a theory of war and air and space power, including an understanding of what doctrine is, and what its utility and limitations are. Since its earliest days, airpower has been one of the dominant forces used by the American military. American airmen, both Navy and Air Force, have been continually striving to achieve precision strikes in high altitude, at long range, or in darkness. The search for precision attack from standoff distances or altitudes has been imperative to national objectives with expenditure of American lives, treasure, and time. This work covers the whole history of American aviation with special attention to the development of smart weapons and unmanned aerial vehicles and the influence they have had on the effectiveness of airpower. In a chronological treatment, emphasizing theory and doctrine, technology, tactics, and strategy. Mets also details both combat experience and intellectual processes, lethal and non-lethal, involved in the preparation of airpower. In addition to the narrative discussion, the work offers sidebars and feature sections that facilitate the understanding of key weapons systems and operational challenges. It also offers A Dozen-Book Sampler for Your Reading on Air and Space Theory and Doctrine. The work concludes with a brief look at information warfare and with some speculations about the future. Through this thorough consideration of the evolution of American airpower and technology, Mets provides, not only a map of the past, but a guide to future generations of airpower and its potential for keeping the United States strong and safe. For the past eight decades, many progressive-minded airmen have argued that bombers offer a way to win wars more quickly and more cheaply than a reliance on surface forces. Vastly improved technology has reinforced the notion that bombing can achieve almost antiseptic results, and the idea of a near-bloodless victory has had a special appeal to Presidents as well

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as to Air Force pilots. That is not to say that progressive ideals have always dictated how America has used airpower. In some cases during the previous 80 years, progressive notions have remained dormant or been transformed; in others, they have been loudly articulated. Still, as the al-Zarqawi raid shows, they have never completely disappeared from the way American political and military leaders think about bombing. Thus, the progressive assumptions that have helped to shape the American approach to airpower merit close scrutiny. Airpower is a term that includes both lethal and nonlethal uses of military force above the Earth's surface, but in this article, the term denotes bombing, the lethal application that has triggered the greatest amount of debate regarding its utility. The article's purpose is threefold: first, to examine the progressive roots of American airpower and how they have helped mold bombing concepts during the past eight decades; second, to explore why and how wartime Presidents have periodically embraced progressive tenets and married them with their war aims; and third, to show that the central premise of progressive airpower -- that bombing is a rational, just military instrument because it makes war cheaper, quicker, and less painful for all sides than surface combat -- is a flawed notion that frequently undercuts American political objectives and helps to achieve the antithesis of the desired results.

Bombing to Win Air Power and Coercion in War Cornell University Press

... dedicated to the advancement and understanding of those principles and practices, military and political, which serve the vital security interests of the United States.

Presents revised and edited papers from a October 2010 conference held in Taipei on the Chinese Air Force. The conference was jointly organized by Taiwan's Council for Advanced Policy Studies, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, the U.S. National Defense

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University, and the RAND Corporation. This book offers a complete picture of where the Chinese air force is today, where it has come from, and most importantly, where it is headed. This volume examines the theory and practice of air power from its earliest inception. This tightly argued and profoundly thought provoking book tackles a huge subject: the coming of the nuclear age with bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945, and the ways in which it has changed our lives since. Dr Heuser sets these events in their historical context and tackles key issues about the effect of nuclear weapons on modern attitudes to conflict, and on the ethics of warfare. Ducking nothing, she demystifies the subject, seeing 'the bomb' not as something unique and paralysing, but as an integral part of the strategic and moral context of our time. For a wide multidisciplinary and general readership.

Director and producer Tim Burton impresses audiences with stunning visuals, sinister fantasy worlds, and characters whose personalities are strange and yet familiar. Drawing inspiration from sources as varied as Lewis Carroll, Salvador Dalí, Washington Irving, and Dr. Seuss, Burton's creations frequently elicit both alarm and wonder. Whether crafting an offbeat animated feature, a box-office hit, a collection of short fiction, or an art exhibition, Burton pushes the envelope, and he has emerged as a powerful force in contemporary popular culture. In *The Philosophy of Tim Burton*, a distinguished group of scholars examines the philosophical underpinnings and significance of the director's oeuvre, investigating films such as *Batman* (1989), *Edward Scissorhands* (1990), *The Nightmare before Christmas* (1993), *Sleepy Hollow* (1999), *Big Fish* (2003), *Sweeney Todd* (2007), *Alice in Wonderland* (2010), and *Dark Shadows* (2012). The essays in this volume explore Burton's distinctive style, often disturbing content, and popular appeal through three thematic lenses: identity, views on

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authority, and aesthetic vision. Covering topics ranging from Burton's fascination with Victorian ideals, to his celebration of childhood, to his personal expression of the fantastic, the contributors highlight the filmmaker's peculiar narrative style and his use of unreal settings to prompt heightened awareness of the world we inhabit. *The Philosophy of Tim Burton* offers a penetrating and provocative look at one of Hollywood's most influential auteurs.

A major history of technology and Western conquest For six hundred years, the nations of Europe and North America have periodically attempted to coerce, invade, or conquer other societies. They have relied on their superior technology to do so, yet these technologies have not always guaranteed success. *Power over Peoples* examines Western imperialism's complex relationship with technology, from the first Portuguese ships that ventured down the coast of Africa in the 1430s to America's conflicts in the Middle East today. Why did the sailing vessels that gave the Portuguese a century-long advantage in the Indian Ocean fail to overcome Muslim galleys in the Red Sea? Why were the same weapons and methods that the Spanish used to conquer Mexico and Peru ineffective in Chile and Africa? Why didn't America's overwhelming air power assure success in Iraq and Afghanistan? In *Power over Peoples*, Daniel Headrick traces the evolution of Western technologies—from muskets and galleons to jet planes and smart bombs—and sheds light on the environmental and social factors that have brought victory in some cases and unforeseen defeat in others. He shows how superior technology translates into greater power over nature and sometimes even other peoples, yet how technological superiority is no guarantee of success in imperialist ventures—because the technology only delivers results in a specific environment, or because the society being attacked responds in unexpected ways. Breathtaking in scope, *Power over Peoples* is a

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revealing history of technological innovation, its promise and limitations, and its central role in the rise and fall of empire. Some images inside the book are unavailable due to digital copyright restrictions.

Conflict is central to human history. It is often the cause, course and consequence of social, cultural and political change. Military history therefore has to be more than a technical analysis of armed conflict. *War in the Modern World since 1815* addresses war as a cultural phenomenon, discusses its meaning in different societies and explores the various contexts of military action.

Bombing Civilians examines a crucial question: why did military planning in the early twentieth century shift its focus from bombing military targets to bombing civilians? From the British bombing of Iraq in the early 1920s to the most recent policies in Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq, and Lebanon, *Bombing Civilians* analyzes in detail the history of indiscriminate bombing, examining the fundamental questions of how this theory justifying mass killing originated and why it was employed as a compelling military strategy for decades, both before and since the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

Beauty is in the eye of the beholder. Perhaps because the apparent target audience for John Warden's book, *The Air Campaign*, is the practitioner of the operational art, while Robert Pape seems to have written for the academic audience in *Bombing to Win*, this reviewer was compelled by Warden's argument that strategic use of air power is worthwhile and left a bit bewildered by Pape's insistence that only tactical air power used at the theater level is worth the effort. The seeming rightness of *The Air Campaign* could also be explained by the fact that this generation of Air Force officers was raised on Warden's principles from the earliest days in

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professional military education classes. Regardless, there is benefit to viewing both sides of the debate to glean what lessons may be learned from history as well as understand current thinking on the appropriate use of air power. This review will first look at each author's thesis and his supporting data and conclusions, as well as critique the information provided. It will then go on to compare and contrast the two works, and discuss why Warden's argument seems more valid than Pape's.

An ideal textbook for classes on modern airpower and joint operations.

Will the information age witness a transformation in the nature of war? Putting the notion to the test, the author uses a range of contexts to assess whether the Clausewitzian nature of war will retain its validity.

Throughout this first century of air power, military theorists have proposed numerous schemes as the best use of air power. Airmen of many nations tried and tested these theories in wars large and small and they have learned, ignored, or forgotten many lessons. Of the four major coercive mechanisms available to air power punishment, risk, military denial and decapitation Robert Pape in *Bombing to Win*, concludes that military denial is the best use of air power. Furthermore, Pape argues that recent technological advances only enhance the military denial mechanism. In his appendix, Pape categorizes the Italian case as another case of successful military denial. This study examines the collapse of Italy in 1943 and the contribution of air power to this collapse. Several broad works, often citing Ernest May in *Lessons from the Past*, claim that air power decisively caused the Italian surrender, but do not indisputably argue this point or do they define the coercive mechanism air power employed to achieve this result. Studies such as the United States Strategic Bombing Survey or the British Bombing Survey

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Unit largely ignore Italy or in the case of F. W. Dakin *The Brutal Friendship*, cite the coalition politics as the primary cause of Italy's surrender. This book reveals how air power made four contributions to the collapse of Italy. First, airpower shaped the grand strategy of the western Allied powers in 1943. The Americans preferred to wage an air campaign to destroy German industry while using the direct approach of a cross channel invasion to defeat Germany. Under the leadership of Churchill, the strong British preference for an indirect strategy aimed at the soft-underbelly of Europe as well as the belief in the efficacy of air power to cause the Italian surrender through morale bombing artfully maneuvered the United States into waging a prolonged campaign in Africa and the Mediterranean. Second, mainland attacks against rail marshaling yards, ports and airfields did indirectly contribute militarily to operations HUSKY and AVALANCHE. The destruction of six key rail nodes was part of an over-all interactive campaign to prevent reinforcements and supplies from reaching first Sicily in support of HUSKY and then southern Italy in support of AVALANCHE. The San Lorenzo marshaling yards in Rome, however, was not one of these six key notes. Additionally, in both HUSKY and AVALANCHE Allied forces enjoyed unprecedented air superiority, which resulted in the ability for strategic air power to pursue operations other than the direct or indirect support of ground operations'. Third, both American and British strategic bombing contributed to the psychological decapitation and fall of the Fascist government on July 25, 1943. In a meeting with Hitler on the nineteenth of July, Mussolini failed to obtain German military aid especially the desperately needed 2000 fighters. Significantly, the first air raid on Rome by over 540 bombers, the largest air raid in history to date, interrupted the meeting. This first raid also convinced the Italian king, a majority of Fascist leaders, and the Pope that Italy must get out of

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the war. A stunned Mussolini called for a meeting of his Grand Council of Fascism for 24 July, where he allowed, in the wee hours of the 25th, Fascist leaders to pass a motion to remove him from command of military forces. Later that day, the King, again in command of the army, arrested a docile, psychologically decapitated Mussolini in a bloodless coup d'état. Finally, air power coerced and aided the interim Badoglio government to surrender unconditionally and escape to the Allies on 9 September. Appointed by the king, Badoglio quickly sent civilian representatives to Lisbon to negotiate a conditional surrender to the Allies, despite the mounting German occupation of Italy. The threat and actual second Rome air raid resulted in the first direct contact between Badoglio's military representatives and the Allies in order to declare Rome

A comprehensive analysis of strategic information warfare waged via digital means as a distinct concern for the United States and its allies. In the "information age," information systems may serve as both weapons and targets. Although the media has paid a good deal of attention to information warfare, most treatments so far are overly broad and without analytical foundations. In this book Gregory Rattray offers a comprehensive analysis of strategic information warfare waged via digital means as a distinct concern for the United States and its allies. Rattray begins by analyzing salient features of information infrastructures and distinguishing strategic information warfare from other types of information-based competition, such as financial crime and economic espionage. He then establishes a conceptual framework for the successful conduct of strategic warfare in general, and of strategic information warfare in particular. Taking a historical perspective, he examines U.S. efforts to develop air bombardment capabilities in the period between World Wars I and II and compares them to

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U.S. efforts in the 1990s to develop the capability to conduct strategic information warfare. He concludes with recommendations for strengthening U.S. strategic information warfare defenses.

Air power for warfighting is a story that's been told many times. Air power for peacekeeping and UN enforcement is a story that desperately needs to be told. In rich detail this volume describes: aircraft transporting vital supplies to UN peacekeepers and massive amounts of humanitarian aid to war-affected populations; aircraft serving as the 'eyes in sky' to keep watch for the world organization; and combat aircraft enforcing the peace. Rich poignant case studies illuminate the past and present use of UN air power, pointing the way for the future.

Written by more than 100 international scholars and experts, this encyclopedia chronicles the individuals, equipment, and drama of nearly a century of aerial combat.

****Included on the Chief of Staff of the United States Air Force's reading list for 2008 and the Royal Air Force's Centre for Air Power Studies 2008 Reading List**** Dr. John Andreas Olsen

has written an insightful, compelling biography of retired U.S. Air Force colonel John A. Warden III, the brilliant but controversial air warfare theorist and architect of Operation Desert Storm's air campaign. Warden's radical ideas about air power's purposes and applications, promulgated at the expense of his own career, sparked the ongoing revolution in military affairs. Legendary in defense circles, Warden is also the author of *The Air Campaign: Planning for Combat* (republished by Brassey's, Inc. in 1989). Presenting both the positives and negatives of Warden's personality and impact in this objective portrait, Olsen offers a trenchant analysis of his revolutionary ideas and great accomplishments.

Japan 1944-45 examines the only time in history that a major war was ended by the use of air

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power. It shows how the United States used a combination of industrial capability and geography to devastate Japan from the air, and why the Japanese, despite a promising start to their defense, proved unable to prevent the XXIst Air Force from destroying their country. Since the early 1930s air power advocates had claimed that aerial bombardment alone could defeat a nation. Yet by January 1945, while it had been the key to winning ground campaigns, from the German Blitzkrieg to the Allies' advance across the Pacific, air power had failed to demonstrate their most audacious claim: that strategic bombing, by itself, could win a war. The United States sought to prove it by reducing the Japanese Home Islands' military and industrial capability through bombing alone until they had to surrender.

One of the first analyses of the pure art of planning the aerial dimensions of war. Explores the complicated connection between air superiority and victory in war. Focuses on the use of air forces at the operational level in a theater of war. Presents fascinating historical examples, stressing that the mastery of operational-level strategy can be the key to winning future wars. 20 photos. Bibliography.

The twentieth century has been popularly seen as "the American Century," as publisher Henry Luce dubbed it, a long period in which the United States had amassed the economic resources, the political and military strength, and the moral prestige to assume global leadership. By century's end, the trajectory of American politics, the sense of ever waxing federal power, and the nation's place in the world seemed less assured. Americans of many stripes came to contest the standard narratives of nation building and international hegemony that generations of historians dutifully charted. In this volume, a group of distinguished junior and senior historians - including John McGreevy, James Campbell, Elizabeth Borgwardt, Eric

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Rauchway, Elizabeth Cobbs Hoffman, and James Kloppenberg - revisit and revise many of the chestnuts of American political history. First and foremost, the contributors challenge the teleological view of the inexorable transformation of the United States into a modern nation. To be sure, chain stores replaced mom-and-pop businesses, interstate highways knit together once isolated regions, national media shaped debate from coast-to coast, and the IRS, the EPA, the Federal Reserve, the Social Security Administration and other instruments of national power became daily presences in the lives of ordinary Americans. But the local and the parochial did not inexorably give way to the national and eventually to global integration. Instead, the contributors to this volume illustrate the ongoing dialectic between centrifugal and centripetal forces in the development of the twentieth century United States. The essays analyze a host of ways in which local places are drawn into a wider polity and culture. At the same time, they reveal how national and international structures and ideas repeatedly create new kinds of local movements and local energies. The authors also challenge the tendency to view American politics as a series of conflicts between liberalism and conservatism, which Arthur Schlesinger, Sr. and Jr. codified as the idea that American national politics routinely experienced roughly fifteen year periods of liberal reform followed by similar intervals of conservative reaction. For generations, American political history remained the story of reform, the rise and fall, triumphs and setbacks of successive waves of reformers - Jacksonian Democrats and abolitionists, Populists and Progressives, New Dealers and Great Society poverty warriors - and, recently, equally rich scholarship has explored the origins and development of American conservatism. The contributors do not treat the left and right as separate phenomena, as the dominant forces of different eras. Instead they assert the liberal

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and the conservative are always and essentially intertwined, mutually constituted and mutually constituting. Modern American liberalism operates amid tenacious, recurring forces that shape and delimit the landscape of social reform and political action just as conservatives layered their efforts over the cumulative achievements of twentieth century liberalism, necessarily accommodating themselves to shifts in the instruments of government, social mores and popular culture. These essays also unravel a third traditional polarity in twentieth century U.S. history, the apparent divide between foreign policy and domestic politics. Notwithstanding its proud anti-colonial heritage and its enduring skepticism about foreign entanglements, the United States has been and remains a robustly international (if not imperial) nation. The authors in this volume - with many formative figures in the ongoing internationalization of American history represented among them - demonstrate that international connections (not only in the realm of diplomacy but also in matters of migration, commerce, and culture) have transformed domestic life in myriad ways and, in turn, that the American presence in the world has been shaped by its distinctive domestic political culture. Blurring the boundaries between political, cultural, and economic history, this collective volume aims to raise penetrating questions and challenge readers' understanding of the broader narrative of twentieth-century U.S. history. According to Robin Higham and Stephen J. Harris, "Flight has been part of the human dream for aeons, and its military application has likely been the dark side of that dream for almost as long." In the twentieth century, this dream and its dark side unfolded as the air forces of the world went to war, bringing destruction and reassessment with each failure. *Why Air Forces Fail* examines the complex, often deep-seated, reasons for the catastrophic failures of the air forces of various nations. Higham and Harris divide the air forces into three categories of

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defeat: forces that never had a chance to win, such as Poland and France; forces that started out victorious but were ultimately defeated, such as Germany and Japan; and finally, those that were defeated in their early efforts yet rose to victory, such as the air forces of Britain and the United States. The contributing authors examine the complex causes of defeats of the Russian, Polish, French, British, Italian, German, Argentine, and American air services. In all cases, the failures stemmed from deep, usually prewar factors that were shaped by the political, economic, military, and social circumstances in the countries. Defeat also stemmed from the anticipation of future wars, early wartime actions, and the precarious relationship between the doctrine of the military leadership and its execution in the field. Anthony Christopher Cain's chapter on France's air force, l'Armée de l'Air, attributes France's loss to Germany in June 1940 to a lack of preparation and investment in the air force. One major problem was the failure to centralize planning or coordinate a strategy between land and air forces, which was compounded by aborted alliances between France and countries in eastern Europe, especially Poland and Czechoslovakia. In addition, the lack of incentives for design innovation in air technologies led to clashes between airplane manufacturers, laborers, and the government, a struggle that resulted in France's airplanes' being outnumbered by Germany's more than three to one by 1940. Complemented by reading lists and suggestions for further research, *Why Air Forces Fail* provides groundbreaking studies of the causes of air force defeats.

This unique book examines a number of common myths and misconceptions about the effectiveness of airpower. Contents include: Chapter 1 - Between the

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world wars, even though the US Army Air Corps received more than its fair share of funds from the Army, it continued to complain, agitate, and ask for more. *

Chapter 2 - Entering World War II, the Air Corps' unbalanced doctrine and force structure leaned too heavily towards strategic bombing. Thus, air support of ground forces was inadequate and largely ignored by airmen. *

Chapter 3 - The Air Corps entered World War II with a "Douhetian" concept of air war that emphasized area bombing and the waging of war on women and children *

Chapter 4 - Airmen thought they could win the war alone * Chapter 5 - The fact that German production, especially of aircraft, continued to increase throughout 1944 proves that the Combined Bomber Offensive (CBO) was ineffective and that the resources devoted to it would have been better spent elsewhere *

Chapter 6 - Bombing was ineffective because it actually stiffened rather than lowered enemy morale. * Chapter 7 - The atomic bombs were unnecessary because Japan was about to surrender; even if it had not given up, an invasion or continued blockade would have been more humane *

Chapter 8 - Overall, strategic bombing was a wasted effort that produced only minor effects * Chapter 9 - Airpower was a failure in Vietnam, losing the war and letting the Army down.

Why even have an Air Force if it can't beat a fourth-rate power like North

Vietnam? * Chapter 10 - Strategic bombing failed in Vietnam because Rolling

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Thunder did not break the will of Ho Chi Minh and his cohorts to continue the war in the south * Chapter 11 - Airpower was an indiscriminate weapon that killed excessive numbers of Vietnamese civilians * Chapter 12 - Too focused on strategic attack during the Persian Gulf War, the Air Force provided inadequate support to ground forces. * Chapter 13 - Air attack is nothing more than "recreational bombing"; pilots fly so high they can't possibly hit their targets accurately * Chapter 14 - Despite all the talk by airmen, the employment of airpower remains an indiscriminate use of military force that deliberately targets civilians

Analyzes the Halt Phase Strategy/Doctrine currently advocated by the Air Force. As a part of his analysis, the author traces the immediate origins of Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review. Dr. Tilford contends, however, that Halt's real origins are more closely identified with intrinsic Air Force strategic bombing doctrine, and are to be found in strategies associated with atomic and nuclear deterrence and warfighting. Thus, he concludes that Halt is really "new wine in old skins" being presented today more aggressively because of rapid technological advances.

Throughout this first century of air power, military theorists have proposed numerous schemes as the best use of air power. Airmen of many nations tried

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and tested these theories in wars large and small and they have learned, ignored, or forgotten many lessons. Of the four major coercive mechanisms available to air power-punishment, risk, military denial and decapitation-Robert Pape in *Bombing to Win*, concludes that military denial is the best use of air power. Furthermore, Pape argues that recent technological advances only enhance the military denial mechanism. In his appendix, Pape categorizes the Italian case as another case of successful military denial. This study examines the collapse of Italy in 1943 and the contribution of air power to this collapse. Several broad works, often citing Ernest May in "Lessons" from the Past, claim that air power decisively caused the Italian surrender, but do not indisputably argue this point nor do they define the coercive mechanism(s) air power employed to achieve this result. Studies such as the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey or the British Bombing Survey Unit largely ignore Italy or in the case of F. W. Deakin's *The Brutal Friendship*, cite the coalition politics as the primary cause of Italy's surrender... In an era of clean conflict, both painless and quick, leaders and airman downplay the psychological effects of air power-with the exception of the questionable negative effects of casualties on the democracies. Operation DESERT STORM typifies both these effects. Furthermore, attrition-based computer wargame simulations largely ignore the human element. The

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collapse of Italy serves as one example where the psychological effects of air power outweighed the physical damage caused by bombing.

This provocative book seeks to answer a most crucial—and embarrassing—question concerning the U.S. military: why the United States is so often stymied in military confrontations with seemingly weaker opponents, despite its "superpower" status. Interviews and data drawn from the author's personal experiences as a U.S. Army officer Six case study chapters on U.S. conflicts where military superiority alone was not the decisive factor in the outcome (the Philippines, World War II, Vietnam, Yugoslavia, Iraq, and Afghanistan)

The events of 1942 marked a pivotal year in the history of British air power. For more than two decades the theory that long-range bombing could win wars had dominated British defense policy. The vast majority of warplanes ordered for the RAF were designed either to bomb enemy cities or stop the enemy from bombing British cities. Conventional armies and the air forces that supported them were seen as an outmoded way of waging war. During 1941 evidence began to mount that British policy was wrong. It had become clear the RAF's bomber offensive against Germany had, until that point, achieved very little. Meanwhile, the wars raging in Europe, Africa and Asia were being decided not by heavy bombers, but

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by armies and their supporting tactical air forces. Britain had never had the resources to build a large army as well as a strategic bomber fleet; it had always had to make a choice. Now it seemed the country might have made the wrong choice. For the first time since 1918 Britain began thinking seriously about a different way of fighting wars. Was it too late to change? Was a strategic bombing campaign the only option open to Britain? Could the United Kingdom help its Soviet ally more by invading France as Stalin so vehemently demanded? Could this be done in 1942? Looking further ahead, was it time to begin the development of an entirely new generation of warplanes to support the Army? Should the RAF have specialist ground attack aircraft and air superiority fighters? The answers to these questions, which are all explored here by aviation historian Greg Baughen, would help shape the development of British air power for decades to come.

This monograph examines how the United States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization employed air power to obtain national objectives in Operation Linebacker II, Operation Deliberate Force, and Operation Allied Force. Operation Linebacker II took place from 18-29 December 1972. It was the only maximum effort bombing campaign of the Vietnam War that targeted the heartland of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, ultimately compelling the negotiations that

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ended the conflict. Operation Deliberate Force, the final operation of the Balkans Air Campaign, was a seventeen-day effort that sought to undermine the military capability of the Bosnian Serb Army and led to the 1995 Dayton Accords. Operation Allied Force was a seventy-eight-day air campaign in 1999 that successfully sustained offensive operations against Serbian forces led by president Slobodan Milosevic and impelled their removal from Kosovo. This monograph primarily uses Dr. Mark Clodfelter's Framework for Evaluating Air Power Effectiveness as a means to evaluate these campaigns and test the hypothesis that an air campaign positively impacts national objectives when it effectively targets an enemy's military vulnerabilities in which it has no equal means of response. These case studies demonstrate air power's ability to obtain or positively contribute to the achievement of national objectives when used as the predominate or sole means of combat power. Findings indicate that while effective targeting was crucial to these campaigns, there were other factors of equal or greater importance. Although each case study provides unique insights to the effective use of air power in pursuit of national objectives, common themes for all three include the evolution of national objectives to match military capability, the isolation of the adversary from its perceived allies, and a type of war waged by the adversary conducive to targeting or exploitation by air

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power. This compilation also includes a reproduction of the 2019 Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community. This monograph examines the specific employment of air power in each of these campaigns to assess how it affected success in achieving national objectives. Borrowing heavily from Robert Pape's *Bombing to Win*, this monograph hypothesizes when an air campaign effectively targets an enemy's military vulnerabilities in which it has no equal means of response, it positively impacts national objectives by making continued military action imprudent. This hypothesis acknowledges that targeting may diverge from original campaign objectives in order to leverage the decisive but devastating effects of air power. To evaluate this hypothesis, this monograph uses the case study framework and the methodology outlined by air power historian and theorist Dr. Mark Clodfelter. In his article, "Airpower Versus Asymmetric Enemies: A Framework for Evaluating Effectiveness" Clodfelter provides a catalogue of variables and associated questions to apply to historical and potential uses of air power to determine its effectiveness. These criteria are further discussed in chapter one of this monograph; however, this monograph primarily considers his variables: (1) the nature of national objectives; (2) the nature of the enemy; (3) the type of war waged by the enemy; and (4) the magnitude of U.S. or allied military controls. It also applies supplemental

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campaign evaluation criteria from the 1994 Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC) Primer and the 2014 Joint Publication 3-30: Command and Control of Joint Air Operations.

With the inception of airpower and the development of its warfighting capabilities, airpower theorists and airman have postulated that airpower could achieve strategic goals unilaterally. Does Operation Allied Force, the Air War over Kosovo, validate this thesis? Or does it offer further historical evidence of the invalidity of the proposition? Using Robert Pape's Coercive Model, Bombing to Win, this study analyzes Operation Allied Force to test the validity of the coercive theory. Future strategic leaders may find the conclusions of this study useful in planning campaigns.

Tracing the use of air power in World War II and the Korean War, Mark Clodfelter explains how U. S. Air Force doctrine evolved through the American experience in these conventional wars only to be thwarted in the context of a limited guerrilla struggle in Vietnam. Although a faith in bombing's sheer destructive power led air commanders to believe that extensive air assaults could win the war at any time, the Vietnam experience instead showed how even intense aerial attacks may not achieve military or political objectives in a limited war. Based on findings from previously classified documents in presidential libraries and air force archives as

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well as on interviews with civilian and military decision makers, *The Limits of Air Power* argues that reliance on air campaigns as a primary instrument of warfare could not have produced lasting victory in Vietnam. This Bison Books edition includes a new chapter that provides a framework for evaluating air power effectiveness in future conflicts.

This Air Force publication traces the development of the bombing of the Japanese home islands, from the modest but dramatic Doolittle raid on Tokyo in April 1942, through the effort to bomb from bases in China that were supplied by airlift over the Himalayas, to the huge 500-plane raids from the Marianas in the Pacific. The campaign changed from precision daylight bombing to night incendiary bombing of Japanese cities and ultimately to the use of atomic bombs against Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The story covers the debut of the spectacular B-29 aircraft--in many ways the most awesome weapon of World War II-- and its use not only as a bomber but also as a mine-layer. The strategic bombardment of Japan during World War II remains one of the most controversial subjects of military history because it involved the first and only use of atomic weapons in war. It also raised the question of whether strategic bombing alone can win wars, a question that dominated U.S. Air Force thinking for a generation. Without question, the strategic bombing of Japan contributed very heavily to the

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Japanese decision to surrender. The United States and her allies did not have to invade the home islands, an invasion that would have cost many thousands of lives on both sides. Thousands of miles separated the United States from ultimate victory in the Pacific during World War II. Lt. Col. James H. "Jimmy" Doolittle led the famous raid on the Japanese home islands early in the war, but spanning the vast oceans with concentrated air power proved a daunting task. American naval and ground forces had to secure bases in China and wrest far-flung islands from the tenacious grip of the Japanese. From these bases, the U.S. Army Air Forces (AAF) launched specially designed, very-long-range bombers against the home islands. The strategic bombing campaign, climaxed by the destruction of enemy cities with incendiary and atomic bombs, forced Japan to surrender and spared the United States a bloody invasion. The U.S. air offensive against Japan is the central story of the Pacific war--a drama of human courage and sacrifice and of a unique partnership among modern air, sea, and land forces.

Publisher Description

From Iraq to Bosnia to North Korea, the first question in American foreign policy debates is increasingly: Can air power alone do the job? Robert A. Pape provides a systematic answer. Analyzing the results of over thirty air campaigns, including a detailed reconstruction of the Gulf War, he argues that the key to success is

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attacking the enemy's military strategy, not its economy, people, or leaders. Coercive air power can succeed, but not as cheaply as air enthusiasts would like to believe. Pape examines the air raids on Germany, Japan, Korea, Vietnam, and Iraq as well as those of Israel versus Egypt, providing details of bombing and governmental decision making. His detailed narratives of the strategic effectiveness of bombing range from the classical cases of World War II to an extraordinary reconstruction of airpower use in the Gulf War, based on recently declassified documents. In this now-classic work of the theory and practice of airpower and its political effects, Robert A. Pape helps military strategists and policy makers judge the purpose of various air strategies, and helps general readers understand the policy debates.

This paper will present a comparative review of two books both intended to describe successful methods for employing air power. Despite the similar goal, the books are designed for different audiences. Pape's, *Bombing to Win*, while informative to policymakers, is intended as a first step for social scientists to begin the study of the use of military coercion. Warden's, on the other hand, is aimed primarily at those who will be in a position to plan and conduct an air campaign. Both books rely heavily on information from secondary sources, but their approach to the issues varies greatly. Pape presents his theory of coercion

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and examines case studies from the use of air power in the 20th century to support that theory. Warden uses historical information as well, but his approach is to describe the roles of air power and provide guidelines on how to use them. Despite the two different audiences and methods, if one looks closely, both books come to some surprisingly similar conclusions. Conversely, they have some starkly contrasting views as well. Warden is clearly a proponent of air power and sees its utility in many different uses. Conversely, Pape sees the only valid use of air power as being attacks on fielded forces and vehemently defends that position. Now, turning to the books individually to examine their arguments in more detail.

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